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ABSTRACT
The Ethics of Aerial Bombardment in International Conflicts:
From Douhet to Drones

Rauan Zhaksybergen

In this thesis, I demonstrate how the question of ethics in aerial bombardment has been
evolving and transforming since its inception at the beginning of the twentieth century to
contemporary targeted killings/assassinations by drones. I interact with early airpower theories
from Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and contemporary air tactics in order to establish a crucial
sequence between these early theories and practices of aerial violence and modern ones
conducted by armed drones. I show how the evolution of aerial bombardment challenged,
influenced, and transformed essentials of conventional warfare, as well as dispersed boundaries
between combatants and non-combatants. Contemporary legally uncontrolled targeted killings
by drones now are one of the most discussed issues in military ethics, international law, and
international security spheres. Hence, the interdisciplinary approach in this work helps to
provide a multi-vector view on the question of the ethics of aerial bombardment.

CONTENTS
Foreword

iv

Introduction

1

Chapter 1. The emergence of air supremacy and strategic bombardment theories

10

Chapter 2. Strategic bombardment during the Second World War and nuclear bombing
discussion

22

Chapter 3. Jus in bello and Jus ad bellum in modern warfare

32

Chapter 4. Obscure boundaries. Combatant vs. non-combatant in modern conflicts

39

Chapter 5. Theoretical debates on the Use of Drones

50

Conclusion

58

Bibliography

62

iii

Foreword
The industrial revolutions that have taken place in modern history have led to rapid
scientific and technological progress in all areas of human activity and, in particular, in the
development and use of manned aircraft. The rise of nationalism in Europe provoked two
World Wars that shaped the strategic doctrines and honed the various tactics of warfare.
Consequently, discussions on the moral side of aerial bombardment were raised among
different scholars around the world.
The contemporary digital revolution is shaping the perception of people not only
towards the civilian sphere of life, but also is having a significant impact on the military sphere.
Drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are opening up a major discussion concerning
the legality and morality of unmanned and in the near future uncontrolled (controlled by the
artificial intelligence) bombing of people. Contemporary warfare has become asymmetrical
with emerging forces in the international arena such as insurgents and terrorist organizations
that have the possibility to use such threatening technology as flying drones.
Heavy bombers, which had appeared during the First World War, became the perfect
weapon by the 1930s. Technologies in aircraft construction developed so rapidly that in a few
years a whole generation was replaced in certain areas of military aviation, leaving other areas
behind. By the mid-1930s, for example, a heavy bomber could fly at high speed, at an altitude
of several kilometers, where it was almost impossible to intercept by a fighter jet or shoot it
down with anti-aircraft weapons. It is not surprising that these impressive technologies have
inspired the military to create new doctrines and concepts. A defining feature of air power was
that it was no longer possible to retain the concepts of wartime and peacetime, combatant and
non-combatant.

iv

Introduction
Military theory and doctrine history is a subfield of military history. Theories and
doctrines are concerned with the sphere of ideas, not processes, and this has contributed to the
scarcity of writers in this obscure field. As a result, studying the military history of ideas is a
relatively unexplored area. The situation is even greater when it comes to air power. Pilots from
any state have rarely been branded as philosophers, and only a select number have taken up
this challenge to express their views on how aerial warfare should be employed in combat. Add
to this the comparatively short existence of airpower: less than a century. As a result, there
have been relatively few books, papers, and manuals produced on the theory and philosophy
of air power so far.
To the present day only one book makes an attempt to examine the development of
airpower theory throughout the last century. The book is titled The Paths of Heaven: The
Evolution of Airpower Theory.1 It includes chapters on Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard and
the Royal Air Force (RAF), Billy Mitchell, as well as numerous lesser-known European
thinkers prior to World War II, including Alexander de Seversky, John Boyd, and John
Warden. Additionally, it includes chapters on topics like air superiority in low-intensity
warfare, airpower and ground combat, airpower in NATO, and Soviet air theory. This book
offers to the reader a smooth start in understanding the theory of air superiority from Western
perspective. This work served as a starting point and became a manual for this present study.
The majority of early authors on the airplane’s military applications felt that
surveillance and communication would have the greatest influence on military operations. In
1909, British journalist R.P. Hearne in his work Aerial Warfare realized that aerial surveillance
would have a profound influence on armies, as it would enable armies to establish their
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positions and potential aims more quickly and accurately. 2 He also remarked that airplanes
would be extremely efficient at terrorizing “savage races,” enabling governments to exert more
control over colonial territories. This, too, was an accurate forecast of the Royal Air Force’s
role in imperial policing throughout the interwar period.
It’s remarkable how shallow and/or mechanical the majority of pre-World War II
material on airpower was. Flight was a pivotal moment in human history. As a consequence, it
grabbed people’s interest while also leaving them confused as to what it involved. As a result,
most aviation books begin with a study of what makes airplanes fly, including an explanation
of drag and lift, the difficulties of steering movement, and the impact of weather on aircraft
structures. Following these introductory chapters, writers would begin speculating about the
future of aviation, which they were forced to do due to the scarcity of empirical evidence.
Giulio Douhet, an Italian artillery commander, was the first to think thoroughly about
the function of airpower in battle and also to express his thoughts in public. Douhet’s most
renowned work, The Command of the Air, was published in 1921 in the Italian language.3 Since
Douhet was the first one to write on the most significant airpower challenges, and the majority
of those who followed him, whether knowingly or unknowingly, basically produced
commentary on his thoughts and forecasts.
Douhet thought that World War I proved that conflicts were unavoidable and would be
completely destructive. He also thought that contemporary technology had created an
impenetrable stalemate on the ground. As a consequence, air power, which had paradoxically
contributed to the trench stagnation by eliminating the advantage of surprise, would now revive
war's mobility. Due to airplanes’ capacity to function in the third dimension, they were able to
fly over fortifications, terrain, and river systems that blocked enemy troops. Additionally, they
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could then attack an adversary country's “vital centers,” which were previously guarded by
troops and fortresses: the critical industries and infrastructure that enabled a state to operate.
Due to the fact that aircraft may fly in any direction, at any height, and at any time, planes
would have the tactical element of surprise. As a result, they were unable to be intercepted or
halted. Countries would be prevented from striking out of terror of enemy air reprisal if the
sole defense against air assault was a successful offense. Additionally, Douhet believed that
this was such a revolutionary new way of thinking about combat that only trained pilots with a
thorough understanding of this weapon system should be permitted to command it.
Douhet thought that when discussing a country’s key centers, the psychological impacts
of bombing would be more evident than the physical consequences. As a result, he advocated
for the employment of incendiary and gas bombs. He felt that such strikes would create
widespread terror, prompting the populace to demand an end to the conflict. Douhet thought
that this would happen before a protracted and brutal ground war. He never advocated for the
elimination of the army or navy, but he clearly thought that the air force would be the
predominant rather than subordinate partner in the integrated defense structure. As a result, he
saw no need for aircraft dedicated to land or sea combat.
Douhet’s theories have been challenged by a variety of critics. He badly overestimated
bombing’s physical and psychological consequences. Populations did not disintegrate as
rapidly as he anticipated under the strain of air bombardment. There is effective anti-aircraft
defense. Ground conflict did not result in irreversible stasis; mobility was reintroduced by a
mix of technology, different tactics, and airpower. Finally, it has become more evident over
the last few decades, that legal and ethical restrictions do play a significant role in conflict.
William “Billy” Mitchell was the prominent American aviation theorist. He was the top
American aviation commander during World War I. Mitchell was a prolific writer: he authored
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three main aviation books and hundreds of articles. 4 He viewed airpower as a breakthrough
weapon that would coexist with other services. Mitchell suggested the employment of airpower
as a significant contribution to ground or naval campaigns—not as a replacement for them.
Mitchell wrote to persuade the American public, not his professional comrades. As a result, the
majority of his published works have been criticized as mere propagandistic. He did, however,
publish an essential doctrinal handbook for private use that more accurately represents his
views on how airpower should be used in battle. 5
The leader of the RAF in the interwar period Hugh Trenchard left behind a limited
number of published papers that provide light on his ideas. He lays out some of the fundamental
concepts in Aspects of Service Aviation.6 Aircraft’s mobility and ability to strike almost
anywhere at the start of a war had rendered slow mobilization obsolete. As with the majority
of other airmen, he emphasized the need of air superiority. He felt airpower had the potential
to be decisive in battle, but cautioned against believing it could finish the conflict in a matter
of days or weeks. Air assault had cumulative consequences, necessitating ongoing operations.
Robin Higham’s The Military Intellectuals in Britain provides an excellent overview
of British air thought throughout the interwar period.7 This book has two chapters on the RAF:
the first discusses doctrine generally, while the second discusses personalities such as Groves,
John Slessor, and James Spaight in greater detail. Higham provides insightful analysis of the
politics and working mechanism of the RAF establishment, but his hostility against Trenchard
is obvious.

4

See William Mitchel, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power--economic
and Military (University of Alabama Press, 2009); William Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I: "from Start to
Finish of Our Greatest War." (New York: Random House, 1960); William Mitchell, Our Air Force: The
Keystone of National Defense (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1921).
5
William Mitchell, Notes on the multi-motored bombardment group, day and night (United States Army Air
Corps, 1923).
6
Air Marshall Sir Hugh M. Trenchard, "Aspects of Service Aviation," The Army Quarterly 2, no. 1 (1921): 1021.
7
Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University
Press, 1966).

4

James M. Spaight was a significant and prominent writer, not just for his razor-sharp
intelligence and insight into aviation issues, but also for his expertise in international law. As
a result, he was frequently consulted by the British government over problems such as the
legitimacy of striking certain targets. He disregarded those who criticized the employment of
planes in battle as somehow unlawful in his first work on the subject, Aircraft in War.8 Spaight
contended that because no international law regulating aerial combat existed at the time, it was
essential to rely on the rules governing land and sea warfare. His reasons, which remained the
conventional interpretation for the next decades, included the assumption that, just as artillery
might bombard a besieged city randomly in order to speed up its surrender, airplanes could do
the same. Spaight wrote a number of other works on the subject of airpower in conflict during
the next decades, the majority of which dealt with its legal implications. Among his most
influential works are Air Power and Cities; Air Power in the Next War; and Air Power Can
Disarm.9
Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence is a seminal work from the Vietnam War that
has had repercussions ever since.10 Schelling was an economist who had previously written
about nuclear strategy and arms control. However, in this work, he put forth the notion that
would become known as “gradual escalation”. Schelling contended that escalating the use of
force might cause an opponent to adjust his attitude. If the force is successful, the opponent
will abstain from whatever behavior was deemed undesirable. The ratchet’s operator may
briefly let off the pressure to give the subject time to consider the situation. If required, force
can be reintroduced at a slightly greater level to determine if the intended outcomes are
obtained. This scenario presupposes that the opponents are “rational actors” that comprehend
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the signals being exchanged. War, in truth, rarely promotes reasonable action. In Vietnam,
Schelling's hypothesis was tested and found inadequate. Nonetheless, the theoretical logic of
his views has persisted; indeed, it appeared to resurface during the air war over Kosovo. It will
be fascinating to observe whether future policymakers view steady escalation more positively.
In the United States, conventional strategic airpower doctrine had been stifled by the
country’s dependence on nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, by the Vietnam War’s
primarily tactical nature. This began to alter with Colonel John Boyd’s works.11 The secret to
winning was to act more swiftly than your opponent, both intellectually and physically. He
articulated this notion through a cyclical process dubbed the OODA Loop (observe-orientdecide-act). Once one side acted, the other side saw the consequences, and the cycle was
restarted. The loop’s most critical phase was the “orient” phase. Boyd hypothesized that the
rising complexity of the contemporary world needed the capacity to take seemingly disparate
facts and ideas from many fields and events, disassemble them to their simplest components,
and then reassemble them in novel and unexpected ways.
Boyd’s tactical air ideas are significant because he eventually postulated that this
continually functioning cycle was at work not just in aircraft dogfights, but also at higher levels
of conflict. Boyd observed that victory always went to the side that could conceive most
creatively and then act fast on that understanding. Although military historians typically recoil
at such a selective application of history, the argument is intriguing. Significantly, by
emphasizing the orientation part of the loop, Boyd was advocating for a strategy geared against
the enemy leadership’s mentality. Although they were proposed by an airman, these theories
encompass much more than a manual for air operations. This mechanism has a profound effect
on warfare in general. However, because of the OODA Loop’s emphasis on speed and the
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unsettling surprise it inflicts on the adversary, Boyd’s theories appear to be particularly suited
to airpower, which embodies both characteristics to the fullest.
Colonel John Warden is also another aviator who has thought carefully about strategic
airpower and has likewise concentrated on adversary leadership. His work, Campaign:
Planning for Combat, remains a staple text at Air University. 12 Although this publication had
a significant effect on Air Force thought, its recommendations for strategic air power were
rather limited. Warden contended that if the leader could be assassinated, kidnapped, or
delayed, the entire country would be rendered incapable of resisting.
Both Boyd and Warden appear to have abandoned the economic focus of prior airpower
theorists. Instead, they concentrate on the adversary's leadership. Unlike Boyd, who aims to
undermine the enemy’s leadership process, Warden wishes to destabilize its shape. The Gulf
War was the apex of this type of aviation strategy. Air strikes on Iraq’s communication system,
roads and railways, and electricity supply not only rendered it physically impossible for
Saddam to handle his armed troops, but also created massive confusion and doubt in his
decision-making process. His OODA Loop was significantly enlarged, and its cycle time
correspondingly slowed.
Most of the academic response to the development of unmanned aircraft as a weapon
of war has been excessively focused with this autonomous element, which is frequently
regarded as the most problematic part of contemporary drone deployments in “targeted
killings” operations. In this perspective, the fact that drones keep their human operatives totally
out of mortal danger has also contributed significantly to the perception of drone warfare as a
truly revolutionary kind of armed conflict that departs from prior legacies of military violence.
While I believe that the “unmanned” or “remote control” factor of drones is troublesome,
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mainly because it expanded and sustained (pre-existing) conditions of asymmetric violence,
this thesis does not conform to the broader trend that views this aspect as the defining feature
of analysis of the drone as a weapon of violence. As such, my work’s scope is limited in that it
does not aim to create an explanation focused on the technological objects - drones themselves.
Nevertheless, as a result of these limitations, the scope of my account has been
expanded as well. By avoiding the topic of technological uniqueness, my perspective on
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles violence does not begin with the idea that the drone must be viewed
as an unidentifiable violent object with no historical background; an item that is fundamentally
different from prior forms or practices of bombing. Instead of focusing exclusively on the
“unmanned” component of the armed drone, this thesis examines closely the “aerial weapon”
component of its definition. This shift in analytical emphasis is important for highlighting the
key similarities between drone warfare and past regimes of aerial violence. This is a paradigm
change that results in a view of drone warfare that stretches beyond the limits of the United
States’ present use of UAVs as a counterterrorism tool. This larger perspective provides an
alternative to the prevalent conceptualization of drone violence as “targeted killings.” As I
demonstrate, a historical perspective requires going beyond the issue of how do we define
unmanned warfare as a new form of war to also include the topic of what elements of violence
continue with a new technology such as the drone.
To begin, I challenge previous approaches to drone bombing that rely solely on the
concept of "targeted murders" to comprehend, explain, and criticize drone violence. I contend
that this narrative has created discursive conditions in which non-lethal violent impacts such
as harm, damage, terror, and immiseration suffered by the victims living under drones are
overlooked and negated because they would seem to fall outside the planned use of drones as
armaments used to seek and kill specific targets. Second, I argue that the widespread trend
among scholars, analysts, and journalists to regard drone warfare as a revolutionary new form
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of armed violence is predicated upon and reinforces a limited understanding of what drone
warfare and past legacies of military violence represent.
I interact with early air power theories and contemporary air tactics in order to establish
crucial sequence between these early theories and practices of aerial violence and modern ones
conducted by armed drones. On the basis of this historical study, I argue that what separates
drone bombing from earlier regimes of aerial violence is not the cessation of reciprocal
violence or the possibility of extremely precise and “surgical” targeting. Indeed, aerial bombing
was founded on the premise that air power is a fundamentally unequal kind of military force.
For early air power theorists, this imbalance was the basis of bombing operations’ strategic
significance. As the instance of colonial air policing demonstrates, the concept that aerial
bombing is a kind of non-reciprocal infliction of violence is inextricably linked to past aerial
bombing tactics. Similarly, this thesis’s historical narrative of aerial bombardment helps make
sense of the widespread violence, damage, and terror experienced by populations targeted by
and living under drones. Because aerial bombing has always been recognized by military
theorists and practitioners to imply broader consequences on targeted populations, such as
terror and demoralisation, I argue that critical thought should account for these effects when
they appear in the case of drone bombing.
While I concur with many of its opponents that drone violence is premised on an
individualisation process – one in which people, rather than populations, have increasingly
become the primary target of aerial bombardment – I situate that process in a different register.
Whereas popular criticisms assert that the introduction of drone technology reduced combat to
manhunting, assassination, or murder, thereby individualizing the violent repercussions of
military action, I maintain that this individualization is largely discursive in character.
Individual targets, in fact, exist only in military contexts and in the methods by which the drone
program methodically finds, locates, and kills individuals.

9

Chapter 1. The emergence of air supremacy and strategic bombardment theories
Air power theorists of the early twentieth century believed that the question air power
posed to military strategists of their day necessitated a break with traditional methods of
thinking about the conduct of war. Their argument was that the major distinction was in the
direction in which the military mind should have looked when considering the possible role of
air forces in a conflict situation. 13 In the past, traditional military study treated war as a
phenomenon that could best be understood through the prism of previous experience. 14
According to the traditionalist view, the study of warfare was primarily impacted by historical
precedent. Thus, military scholarship was primarily concerned with analyzing past battles;
similarly, experts who used this approach regarded themselves as historians — filtering the ash
mountain of events in order to confirm their views or to understand where they went wrong
and discover new concepts of warfare.15
Air power theorists were outraged by this methodological perspective, and they were
right to be. Essentially, their main point of argument was that, once it came towards the subject
of air power, actual information was of little use. According to them, air power might be better
understood through an approach that relied on envisioning future fights rather than dwelling
on previous conflicts. To give an example, William “Billy” Mitchell, the prominent air power
theorist in the United States at the time, 16 stated that the tendency to look for a precedent to
direct each potential action was inappropriate to the study of air power, where “one has to look
ahead and not backward and figure out what is going to happen, not too much what has
happened”.17 Giulio Douhet, an Italian thinker, presented an argument that was comparable to
13
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Mitchell’s in his own way. 18 The preparation for a battle in the air, according to Douhet,
necessitated an effort of the imagination that included nothing less than a mental journey into
the far future.19
According to Douhet, past experience had not only failed to prepare military strategists
for forthcoming air conflicts, but it also served as a hazardous basis for the growth of air power.
After dismissing the preceding frameworks’ cognitive worth, he then went on to compare air
strategists’ job to that of artisans. Just like someone who carefully considers the future use of
the material researchers are about to produce, Douhet remarked, a person planning to construct
a good weapon of war must first ask oneself what the next battle would be like. 20 When air
power theorists like Douhet and Mitchell adopted this future-oriented way of thinking, it
allowed them to disregard current information about military aircraft that didn’t align with their
vision for what such a weapon should accomplish and how it might do it.
It’s also worth noting that air power theorists saw their hostility to military tradition as
extending beyond methodology and philosophy. On the other hand, as military officers, they
felt it was part of their job requirement to be unconventional. The essential principles of war
haven’t changed, since the participants and the game have always been the same, as Douhet
stated.21 When it came to military leaders, he said that the difference between good ones and
great ones was that good ones stayed inside the boundaries of tradition while great ones were
more like gamblers who could cut loose from convention. 22
Like Douhet, Hugh Trenchard praised his fellow airmen for having the type of mental
temperament that Trenchard considered desirable. Trenchard was the first Chief of Staff and
senior post-World War I officer of the Royal Air Force (RAF). David Henderson had twice the
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insight and intelligence as Trenchard, and more significantly, he was willing to take risks rather
than miss an opportunity that he believed would never come around again, as Trenchard
remarked in complimenting him. 23 As a counterpoint, military theorists noted that the military
leadership was known to be a vocal opponent of any theories that aimed to modernize combat.
When it came to the military forces, Mitchell said that they were the most cautious and, as a
result, more inclined to build on a platform of confidence rather than take any chances to make
a mistake.24 To be an expert in military flying, an officer must be able to think creatively, and
Mitchell believed that the institutional orthodoxy of the army and navy could only produce
officers who would be mentally unsuitable to command the air forces. 25 So air power theorists
valued inventiveness, perception and risk-taking as essential leadership characteristics while
simultaneously seeing themselves as the leaders who possessed an abundance of these traits in
their own personae.
My point is that while air power theorists created for themselves this vision of the
revolutionary intellectual or the adventurous military commander, they did not do it in a
vacuum; rather, they did so within a discursive context. It is more accurate to say that they were
pulling from and contributing to a larger narrative in which aviators were shown as the major
heroes of a technologically advancing society, rather than creating such subjectivity from the
ground up. First and foremost, I would want to emphasize that cultural images of the pilot in
the twentieth century changed over time; they were complex and overlapping. As a result, it
would be inaccurate to restrict these depictions to merely what air power theorists thought of
them, or to assume that they were only relevant to military personnel. Just as flying was not a
military-only endeavor, neither was the image of “the aviator”, a character created only for the
purposes of military recruitment. During the early stages of flying, this was particularly true,
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since the pilot was connected less with the army and more with private owners such as the
Wright brothers, Louis Blériot, and Henry Farman.
First and foremost, being an aviator meant taking a stand against the most established
tradition of all: the natural world. Not by chance, the use of military phrases like “the
conquering of the sky” as appropriate abstractions to convey what they believed to be the core
of an aviator's life purpose was popularized at the time by media and other authors of the day. 26
Furthermore, because aviators were recognized for their accomplishments in flying an airplane,
simply being an aviator was evidence of the victory of human inventiveness over the rules of
nature at the time. Cultural depictions of civil aviators, in this regard, glorified the act of flying
by converting what was fundamentally a mechanical achievement into a militarized activity. 27
This type of sensationalist discourse persisted when the aviator image became
genuinely militaristic — that is, when personnel of the armed services began to identify with
it. However, in the latter instance, the rhetoric was also flipped. While aviation was previously
portrayed as a glorious endeavor since it closely resembled combat, now it was warfare that
was allegedly transformed into an experience by adding aviation. At the heart of this discussion
was a determinist vision of the airplane as a technological breakthrough that would inevitably
transform the character of war and bring in a radical new age of combat.
To emphasize the heroic nature of aerial combat even more, air power theorists
frequently compared it with ground combat, which they saw as a more costly and inglorious
effort. Their point was that the modern military had reached the end of its evolution and was
no longer capable of achieving a swift and decisive success. For them, World War I was a case
in point: a paralyzing conflict between two opposing armies that immobilized one another for
years while condemning their men to pointless death and suffering. This contemptuous view
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of land-based wars permeated postwar writings by theorists such as Basil Liddell Hart, 28 J. F.
C. Fuller, and J. M. Spaight, who propagated a somewhat distorted official history that
represented aviation in war as a success in comparison to the army’s supposedly disappointing
performance on the Somme and at Passchendaele, the navy’s performance at Jutland, the
horrific cost in human lives.29 On the other hand, the work of these air commanders was critical
in supporting the notion that aircraft – and, more specifically, its capacity to bring a military
presence to the sky – offered a technical answer to ground troops’ physical limitations. Battle
in the air was imagined in this way as a means of escaping the cycle of monotony and death
endured by men in the trenches; combat with planes converted war into a whole new
experience. According to historian John H. Morrow, the employment of airplanes during World
War I generated romantic visions of heroic young aviators dressed in long leather jackets and
helmets, peering from open cockpits to hunt or to be hunted.30 Aviation, according to air power
theorists, raised combat to an entirely new dimension of existence - both literally and
metaphorically.
Contrary to popular opinion, the notion that military aircraft advanced warfare was
supported by the conviction that this invention also restored battle to its presumably noble past.
‘War in the air,’ declared a recruitment brochure for the Royal Flying Corps in the United
Kingdom, reminds of bygone eras when knights went forth to combat and gained glory and
honor by their acts of personal valor. 31 Unlike army soldiers, the Royal Flying Corps’
advertisement told recruits that their lives would be filled with passion, excitement, adventure,
and possibilities for magnificent success. 32 Aviation was therefore a technological
advancement that restored war's reputation as an attractive and honorable activity. The
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portrayal of pilots as air knights aided in the romanticization of the air war into a single picture
of lethal yet gallant individual battle. 33 This depiction of a romantic combat emphasized the
uniqueness of airborne heroes, in contrast to trench-bound troops who were plowing through
the dirt with so little heroism to avoid mechanized mass slaughter.34
To summarize, the aerial subjectivity lauded and self-identified with by air power
theorists was discursively placed inside a larger narrative about aviation and aviators. By
emphasizing characteristics like creativity, intuition, and risk-taking, these strategists were
really replicating and strengthening an already existing image of the aviator as the
unconventional pioneer of a new era of technical progress. This kind of subjectivity, according
to John Andreas Olsen, in the instance of Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, lends itself to a
triumphalist vision of technology... as a flawless “silver bullet” solution to war’s difficulties.35
It was a point of view that enabled them to answer a series of apparently military issues, such
as, how might the conduct of warfare be improved? What role might air power play in future
conflicts? How should aircraft be implemented? – by using a technical progressivist vocabulary
that hailed both the possibility of aerial combat and their role in creating and advancing such
warfare.
A fundamental argument made by early air power theorists was that institutional
independence for air forces was an essential precondition for air power evolution. The majority
of air power theorists at the time agreed on this point: without the organizational, economic,
logistical, and tactical freedoms offered by institutional autonomy, air power’s expansion
would be severely restricted.36 They reasoned that if the navy and army retained command of
the air forces, air power would “always be vulnerable to ground or marine operations,”
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reducing the usefulness of air forces from a powerful offensive weapon to a simple aerial
support.37 Thus, for air power theorists, the rise of air power necessitated a two-fold paradigm
change: first, a methodological move away from conventional modes of thinking about
warfare; and second, fundamental organizational reform culminating in the formation of a
separate air service.
The ideological environment during which air power theory developed was also critical
for theoretical orientations of air power theorists. Through trying to pursue air force
independence, these theorists encountered two mutually reinforcing conditions: on the one side,
their reasoning for autonomy rested on the argument that air power had the potential to
revolutionize warfare; on the other side, as Douhet noted, such potential can only be realized
if and only to the extent that air forces were given autonomy. The issue that air power theorists
had was that empirical methods played against their arguments for autonomy. This was partly
due to a severe lack of practical information about aviation's capabilities, since engine aircraft
had seen relatively little combat usage in battle years before World War I.
The gap in knowledge existed not just at the tactical level of an aircraft’s use in combat,
but also at the technological level of the vehicle. At the time, as argued by David C. Mowery,
flying technologies were still in a development and hence largely untested.38 Mechanical issues
– such as the airplane motor’s limitations, the adversities that environment or weather extremes
may impose on its operation, and the dependability of navigation systems – could thus not be
easily corrected or resolved via comparison to previous experiences. 39
Thus, to the extent that World War I’s combat experience justified aviation, it did so by
emphasizing the airplane’s supporting function rather than its potential to effectively win
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battles via individual action. The effectiveness of aircraft in retaining a supporting position was
really a defeat for air power theorists, as it bound the air forces even closer to the army and
navy’s command, rather than liberating them. Existing information therefore provided a shaky
logical basis for air power thinkers to build their theories on; real experience with military
planes was both insufficient and unattractive to support thinkers like Douhet and Mitchell. As
a result, these theorists’ attachment to a conceptual and long-run approach had a very practical
function: it enabled them to legitimize their image of an air-only war by systematically
disregarding real evidence to the contrary. The resulting philosophy, as scholar Malcolm Smith
defines it, was a horrific creation, a combination of “dogma, opportunism and pragmatism”
predicated on no single, distinct, and clear explanation. 40
For British thinkers, air strategy entailed a fundamental departure from the notion of
combat. They contended that in conventional warfare, the connection between the force applied
and defeating an opponent manifested itself in two interconnected aims: first, removing the
opponent's physical capability to fight a war (specifically, its militarized forces), and second,
subjugating its will to fight a war.41 Trenchard, a vocal supporter of strategic bombing, claimed
that the initial target was not a goal by itself, but rather a method to destroy the enemy’s desire
to continue fighting. He asserted that the true purpose of war was to destroy the opposing state,
not just its infantry, fleet, or air force. 42 His argument was that militaries could not seek success
without first confronting the opponent's armed forces - armies were obliged to seek combat
owing to their earth - based origin.
Trenchard likewise regarded the battleground to be an outdated location for air strategy
by downplaying the significance of combat as the only road to success. This theoretical
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elimination of the battleground resulted in the air forces being framed as a fundamentally
aggressive weapon of war. The RAF’s initial doctrine, Operations Manual, released in 1922,
said that in ground combat, the attack is not a homogenous body, but is continuously combined
with the defensive. Because the battleground was a struggle between competing factions, one
force's ability to support an attack was always related to the other force’s ability to counter it.
Armies might be offensive, defensive, or occasionally both, depending on the circumstances
of the conflict in which they were engaged. However, because the enemy troops were perceived
to be incapable of resisting air forces, the latter’s attacking capability was viewed in absolute
instead of relative terms. Even the opponent’s opposing air force wasn’t really considered a
major obstacle by British air power strategists, as it should be recognized that no number of
aircraft flying defensively would necessarily prevent a committed pilot from accomplishing his
goal. For his part, Douhet did not merely embrace this confidence in the limitless attacking
ability of air forces; he took it to its rational conclusion. 43 Air power, he believed, simply
reduces the opponent to a passive actor whose intentions or actions have no impact on the air
weapon’s lethality. 44 In agreement with Douhet, proponents of strategic bombing emphasized
that because aircraft have nearly limitless freedom of movement, there is literally no defense
against their capacity to infiltrate and attack the enemy’s most vulnerable and well-defended
locations. 45 Mitchell, in particular, contended that the new geographical dimension in which
air power worked made aerial attack universal; as he remarked, just as the air surrounds the
whole earth, aircraft may fly anyplace on the earth. 46
As previously mentioned, aerial campaigns were viewed as a distinctively unilateral
imposition of violence. According to air power thinkers, air forces’ capacity to leap over the
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troops that protect opposing government, industries, and population enabled them to attack
directly and quickly at the heart of the enemy’s will and policy. 47 As British air power theorist
Liddell Hart noted, this stress could be applied in a variety of ways and at many locations, and
the ideal approach was to find and exploit the opposing state’s Achilles’ heel; to aim not against
its thickest line of defense, but against its most sensitive. 48 Once this is recognized, he said,
common sense dictates that the strategic objective should move away from the strongest of the
opponent’s pressure points – specifically, its military forces – and toward those “vital centers”
whose annihilation would quickly drive the opponent to surrender.49 While the logic underlying
Liddell Hart’s thesis was straightforward, the ambiguity of the phrase “vital center” resulted in
divergent views on the precise objective of strategic bombing. By portraying industrial units
and railroads as vital components of the war engine, Trenchard established that they were
acceptable military targets, despite the unavoidable civilian deaths. 50 Thus, he argued that while
dropping bombs on a town blindly with the sole purpose of terrorizing the civilian population
was unjustified, terrorizing munition laborers by attacking their housing was not only
acceptable but vital, however he did not clarify how these residences would be recognized or
how the terror of bombing them would be encapsulated so as not to affect the general
population.51
Given that the manufacturing areas that Trenchard considered to be justifiable military
targets were located within or quite near to population centers, the concept of bombing an
opponent's “vital centers” effectively blurred the line between what constituted a “military
target” and what constituted “civilians.”52 Indeed, Liddel Hart’s “Achilles heel” argument for
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targeting the opponent at its most vulnerable pressure line obliterated that distinction entirely
– it was a strategic proclamation that classified civilians, a group portrayed by theorists as the
embodiment of the opponent’s vulnerability, as military objectives.
The air power theorists’ opinion on the role of population in aerial bombardment was
also affected by the fact that their concept of air power was driven from the start by a concern
with the “moral” rather than “material” impacts of bombing.53
It's noteworthy to highlight three significant implications of the notion of “moral
impact” on the formulation of air strategy. The first is about how the RAF command used the
ambiguity of this term to overstate the impact of aircraft assaults without risk of empirical
disagreement.54 A classic example of this type of exaggerated argument is Trenchard’s famous
declaration that bombing should strive to inflict the largest moral damage achievable, since at
the moment, the moral impact of bombing definitely outweighed the material effect by a factor
of twenty to one.55 According to one scholar, Trenchard’s proportion was entirely fictional and
without any mathematical and scientific foundation.56 Due to the dynamic nature of moral
impact, it could not be measured, which meant that statements like Trenchard’s could not be
easily refuted. Thus, the problem of properly measuring the psychological effect of bombings
was precisely what enabled Trenchard and his associates to assign it a numeric value
that created the illusion of logical or mathematical thinking.
Additionally, air power theorists employed the concept of “moral impact” to promote
the notion that aerial combat was a positive advance in the conduct of war. Their thesis was
that the psychological effect of bombing indicated clearly that the bomber was a special
weapon capable of directly attacking the war’s primary aim (the opponent’s will to fight). They
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claimed that a merciless bombing attack that directly influenced that objective was far more
effective than prior strategic methods that did it indirectly. Additionally, by emphasizing the
moral consequences of bombing above the physical consequences, these thinkers framed aerial
warfare as a more effective, but also more “merciful,” “humane” and useful type of armed
combat.57 Thus, the binary choice between ethical effects and physical violence invoked in
theoretical approaches of strategic bombing enabled the removal of what air power theorists
understood and actually admitted to be true: that the unrestrained killing of civilians is an
inevitable and unquestionable element of “morale” bombing.
Finally, by emphasizing the moral consequences of bombing, air power theorists
established citizens as the primary target of air assaults. As mentioned above, inhabited areas
were considered a primary goal of strategic bombardment. However, with an emphasis on
moral consequences, terrorizing people was no longer considered an incidental result of
strategic bombing, but more the deliberate effect and stated goal.
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Chapter 2. Strategic bombardment during the Second World War and nuclear
bombing discussion
Due to a variety of circumstances, including bombardment inaccuracy, weather
conditions, high fatality rates, and a strategic preference for area bombing, the RAF and USAF
both resorted to bombing targeted at workers’ housing by igniting massive firestorms in
residential neighborhoods all over Europe. Although the nuclear bombings on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were notable for their purpose to kill non-combatants, they killed roughly the same
number of civilians as conventional incendiary assaults on Dresden and Tokyo.
According to Grayling, Britain’s bombardment of German towns was a “moral crime”
based on the same criteria used by the allied forces to convict German and Japanese war
criminals. However, others still think that the bombardment was absolutely legitimate, as a
result of the unavoidable disintegration of the boundary between combatant and non-combatant
in conflicts, or as an example of extreme emergency when urgent need transcends established
standards.58 One exclusion from Grayling’s generally comprehensive account of this operation
is a discussion of Michael Walzer’s so-called ‘supreme emergency’ defense.59 This is a strange
exclusion considering that, among modern political theorists, supreme emergency is frequently
cited to defend acts that ostensibly violate the most fundamental norm regulating war: noncombatant immunity. 60 John Rawls, like Walzer, claimed that in contrast to the bombing of
German towns at the start of the Second World War, a state of extreme emergency might justify
the deployment of nuclear weapons. According to Rawls, the 1945 atomic bombs should be
condemned solely because America was not yet confronted with a supreme emergency. 61
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Michael Walzer’s just war argument was based on human rights. He believes that a thin
layer of norms drawn from positive legislation, religious, philosophic, and professional
standards, reciprocity agreements, and public discourse forms a global ‘war convention’. The
second premise of the war convention, according to Walzer, is that non-combatants would
never be assaulted.62 The idea of non-combatant immunity is central to the number of religious
viewpoints on the ethics of war, is rooted in customary law, and has existed in some form or
another in the just war tradition since the nineteenth century. According to Walzer, this is not
a question of providing special advantages to specific classes based on their social or economic
role during peacetime, but rather a matter of a universal human right that transcends time and
location.
To reject the pacifist objection that a just war theory cannot justify war while requiring
non-combatant immunity, because non-combatants could be eventually killed in battle, Walzer
employs a slightly altered concept of twofold impact. 63 The concept of twofold impact,
originally stated in the thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas, maintains that an act committed
with noble intentions can nonetheless have negative effects, such as the death of noncombatants.64
Although Walzer establishes the deontological concept of non-combatant exemption,
he allows for two conceivable exceptions. The first, which we will not discuss in detail, is
reprisals. Walzer argues that belligerents may on occasion lawfully carry out reprisals provided
they successfully persuade their adversaries to abstain from perpetrating the unjust actions that
provoked the reprisals. 65 The second is the notion that non-combatant status may be waived in
extraordinary circumstances.
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According to Walzer, there are instances when the danger posed by war demands the
employment of tactics specifically prohibited by the ‘war convention’. 66 When two criteria are
met, an emergency becomes paramount. To begin, the threat must be immediate. The term
‘imminence’ has two meanings in this context. On the one hand, the threat must be current and
genuine; the fear of future harm is not adequate.
The threat’s nature is the second factor of extreme urgency. During times of conflict,
every nation thinks it is confronted by an existential threat. This, however, is insufficient.
According to Walzer, the threat must be ‘unique and frightening’; in other word, it must strike
humanity’s consciousness. 67 As Walzer states, the majority of conflicts are not about defending
‘ultimate ideals.’ Nations only confront a supreme emergency when defeat would result in the
extinction of a political body or its way of life.
Walzer illustrates his idea by referring to Britain’s decision to begin attacking German
population centers. Walzer believed that Nazism constituted the supreme emergency, but his
explanation of the decisions to bomb German towns is founded on two simple fictions that he
admits as such. The first is that Britain fought alone against Germany in the second part of
1940.68 Second, Walzer maintains that Britain’s only option in the closing months of 1940 was
to conduct a strategic bombing of cities. 69
At the start of the war, there was still a marked contrast between how politicians and
the general public perceived area bombing and how air-power planners viewed it. While some
politicians and members of the general public expressed concerns about its ethics and agitated
for worldwide prohibition, a common understanding developed among strategists that area
bombing was the most effective way to employ strategic air power and was morally preferable
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to prolonged slaughter in the trench warfare. 70 The widespread acceptance of this perspective
casts doubt on the key tenet of the ‘supreme emergency’ argument, namely that area bombing
represented itself as the sole way to respond to the terrible emergency induced by Hitler’s
hegemony in Europe. Area bombing was the very first, not the final, option for many air
strategists.
Prior to 1939, area bombing was a pillar of British strategic thought. Strategists argued
that bombing enemy cities would ultimately save lives by eliminating the necessity for trench
warfare. Hugh Trenchard, the RAF’s first commander, was also a strong proponent of area
bombing. Following the First World War, Trenchard stated that Germany was spared from
demolishing industrial centers only by a lack of resources.71
Trenchard contended that attacking the opponent’s military made no sense as it
included strikes on the enemy’s ‘strongest point.’ He contended that the air force should be
directed against the opponent's economic and residential centers in order to disrupt output and
morale.72 Trenchard was well aware of the ethical and legal consequences of terror bombing.
Indeed, he acknowledged that it was contrary to the principles of humanity to bomb a city
indiscriminately for the sole goal of terrorizing the civil population. 73 However, in a phrase that
became a popular justification for British bombing campaigns during the war, Trenchard
contended that, because a state’s industrial base defined its military capability, bombing
directed at ‘dehousing’ manufacturing workers was legal and legitimate, and that ‘moral effect’
(undermining popular will) was an inevitable consequence of a legitimate operating
condition.74 In other words, the moral impact considered necessary for victory would be a
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byproduct of strikes on valid military objectives (industries and workers’ homes). This phony
double-effect argument was originally proposed in 1928, when the British armed services’ high
command convened an investigation into the legitimacy of area bombing. The report concluded
that assaults against industrial, economic, and military sites within German cities aimed at
undermining worker morale were absolutely acceptable targets of aerial bombardment that
should be treated as regular acts of war. 75
Trenchard’s ideas were also supported by non-RAF strategists. Although he had little
visible direct influence on RAF thought during the inter-war years, Giulio Douhet, the preeminent thinker of air superiority during the inter-war years, was a fervent supporter of area
bombing. Douhet concurred with Trenchard’s opinion that future conflicts might be won only
by aerial superiority. He claimed that the only way to destroy an industrialized state was to
crush the enemy populations will to fight.76
Douhet denied that this method of bombing was cruel. Instead, he advanced a
straightforward utilitarian defense of terror bombing, claiming that fortunately, the outcome
will be swift. since the decisive strikes will be focused at civilians, the weakest link in the
countries at war. Additionally, Douhet claimed that the difference between combatant and noncombatant made little sense in industrialized nation-state warfare.77
Although he later opposed terror bombing of German towns, owing in part to his
relatively favorable opinion of Hitler, British strategist Basil Liddell Hart had previously
adhered to Douhet’s notion that area bombing might help decrease overall war deaths. 78
According to Liddell Hart, a future European conflict modeled after the First World War will
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result in the collapse of Western civilization. 79 By putting the industrialized nations’
capabilities against each other, conventional warfare will only become more devastating.
According to Liddell Hart, the objective was to discover and strike the opponent’s weak areas.
The lessons of the First World War indicated that the civil population’s will to fight had been
the weakest link. Thus, if a segment of the population can be demoralized, the collapse of its
desire to resist pushes the entire population to capitulate. 80
As with Douhet, Liddell Hart claimed that ethical arguments against area bombing were
incorrect since the overall harm caused by this form of conflict would be less than the harm
caused by a replay of the First World War. In other words, global conflicts eliminated the
barrier between fighters and non-combatants.
According to Walzer, a state of “supreme emergency” is a moral catastrophe in which
political leaders may be obliged to behave inappropriately due to a pressing need. This
conventional sense of “supreme emergency” refers to a catastrophic conflict between what is
essential and what is moral, as described by Ignatieff and others.81
As a result, for classic realists, need and right are complementary rather than adversarial
in a tragic conflict. ‘Right’ does not prevail over necessity. Politicians, on the other hand, must
choose between many sets of ideals. They are comparing one set of values (say, national
security) against another when they apparently prioritize necessity above right (for example,
non-combatant immunity). Only when society or leaders determine that something is worth
fighting for, acts become imperative. Political leaders are given 'special permissions' to behave
in ways that are usually banned in such instances.
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In conclusion, the history of the Second World War demonstrates that, within liberal
societies, “supreme emergency” does not constitute a license for the intentional murder of noncombatants, but rather a license to define the standards of double effect more liberally.
Nuclear era
At the end of World War II air Force officials, like the majority of the American
population, supported using the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but not because they
wanted uncontrolled devastation of Japan - or even because they believed the attacks were
essential to finish the war. The Army Air Forces (AAF) were satisfied that traditional strategic
bombing, largely conducted at night by B-29s packed with incendiaries, had effectively forced
the Japanese surrender.82 Indeed, the Air Force’s support for the atomic bombings was
motivated more by planned measures of the other US military forces than by enemy activities.
The Air Force, paradoxically, backed the bombs since they appeared to accelerate the war’s
conclusion and prevented the rest of the US military from sacrificing hundreds of thousands of
American lives in a needless invasion of the Japanese islands.
While the majority of just war philosophies prohibit attacking an opponent only for the
sake of vengeance, an eye-for-an-eye attitude sometimes attracts proponents. The truth remains
that one of President Truman's arguments for dropping the atomic bomb was that the Japanese
initiated the war by attacking Pearl Harbor from the air. 83 This vindictive attitude was also
widespread among the general public, maybe as a result of Truman's influence, and the Air
Force acknowledged this reality.
First and foremost, air chiefs supported the nuclear bombings because of their vengeful
mindsets toward Japan; second, and perhaps more notably, they believed that it would prevent
countless numbers of young American soldiers from dying as a result of stubborn invasion
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plans of those leaders who were uninitiated in the catechism of aerial bombardment; and third,
and also most importantly, they backed the nuclear bombings merely because their Commander
instructed it.
According to the AAF, the nuclear bomb did not spark any type of ethical revolution or even that much of a military revolution, for that matter. “Air leaders understood that they
had an opportunity to place combat on a more affordable, logical, and reasonable foundation,”
according to Ira Eaker.84
Morris Janowitz argued that many reasons prevented the nuclear bomb from bringing
about an overnight transformation in the face of war, according to air chiefs who were educated
to be realists and who had access to knowledge that the general population did not have.85
When it came to restrictions in the early years of the atomic era, the shortage of bombs, the
scarcity of qualified atomic air force pilots and specially adapted bombers, and the length of
time it required to transport and build atomic weapons were at the top of the list of issues.
Because Air Force officials did not see a military transformation in 1945, it stands to
reason that they did not detect a moral shift at the same time. In response to the question of
whether he recognized any moral difference between fire bombing attacks and nuclear
bombings, the retired Ira Eaker answered that there was no difference.86 When it came to other
Air Force leaders, most prominently Carl Spaatz and Curtis LeMay, they were as ready to point
out that the consequences of nuclear bombings were identical to those of World War II
incendiary strikes, as well as the fact that they were equally legitimate.87 According to LeMay
the mass killing of noncombatants was not a revolution of strategic nuclear bombings because
such devastation has occurred throughout history whenever a city had been sacked, despite the
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fact that the essence of twentieth-century conflicts blended civilian population with military
and industrial targets.88
For example, one of the reasons why Air Force officials thought that the United States’
military requirement was always ethical and moral because they believed that America was a
completely fair society. Air chiefs elevated America to a religious status, treating a strategic
air force like it was a religion. Officers frequently used religious terminology and saw their
conflict with the Soviet Union as a prophecy of the end of the world. Because the United States
was their last measure for goodness on this planet, the state defined what was right and what
was wrong for these individuals. 89
By the end of the very first nuclear decade, in late 1954, atomic abundance, hydrogen
bombs, Communist stockpiles, and effective delivery technologies had driven the Air Force to
declare a military transformation before the general public. The failure of nuclear arms control
diplomacy, the expansion of Communism, the Berlin Blockade, Soviet nuclear development,
and the Korean War all served to persuade air representatives that their 1945 perceptions were
correct: powerful deterrence continued to work, and anything considered necessary for military
purposes during war - including the use of atomic weapons in a restricted, conventional conflict
- was not only reasonable, but also morally essential. And, throughout this early decade, the
Air Force participated carefully in the public discussion over atomic weapons out of a concern
for its image as well as a sense that it was the right course of action for the United States of
America.
To summarize, the Cold War required Western Democratic societies to learn to live
with atomic weapons, trusting in their strategic potential to conduct a glorious global war with
tyranny while the developed world remained unstable. Everyone was a combatant in this highly
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militarized society since there were no civilians or battlegrounds in the conventional military
perspective. For the early planners, atomic fear from the sky became the necessity of victory,
allowing the Free World to instantly annihilate the adversary without suffering with acceptable
degree of damage. Meanwhile, the Soviet elites created their own images in the context of the
Cold War. They saw the strategic bomber armed with atomic weapons as their only hope
against the imperialist capitalistic enemy’s misdeeds.
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Chapter 3. Jus in bello and Jus ad bellum in modern warfare
Today, the ethics of war is a thriving field of research with an ever-increasing influence
on public debate and decision-making in world politics. And although the normative discourse
of war has existed for a long time, traditional concepts (pacifism, militarism, realism, the theory
of just war), upon closer examination, turn out to be not so obvious and constant. In addition
to moral assessments, numerous socio-cultural and historical factors, stereotypes of mass
consciousness and the interests of political elites, collective ideas and myths of historical
memory have left their imprint on modern ideas about war. The trend of globalization of wars
and risks raised the question of the possibilities of a “new” ethical paradigm, capable of
answering the question of what principles can ensure the integration of a modern global society,
which is characterized by a variety of worldviews and value pluralism.
The classical theory of just war is built on the postulation of principles that encompass
two main normative areas: jus ad bellum (“the right to war”) and jus in bello (“law in time of
war”). From a formal point of view, as pointed out by Nicholas Fotion, a theory is a list of
criteria ("check-lists"), subject to which a war can be a relatively fair thing. 90 Jus ad bellum
describes a set of conditions under which the outbreak of war can be considered normatively
permissible. These include the principles of just cause, legitimate authority, good intentions,
probability of success, proportionality, and an understanding of war as a last resort. As for the
principle of just cause, the most important of them, the following cases are considered as
legitimate reasons for the outbreak of wars: defensive war, aid to an ally, humanitarian
intervention aimed at ending civil wars or changing an aggressive regime, as well as combating
terrorist threats.91
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Jus in bello describes the rules for the use of armed forces during the conduct of
hostilities based on the principles of proportionality of the means used, discrimination and
“double effect.” This means, for example, that civilian casualties and any other harm caused
by war cannot be blamed on the combatants, unless the harm was caused by their deliberate
efforts.
The elements of the theory are related to each other, so their significance can only be
assessed as a whole. For example, the principle of good intentions is assessed against the
background of the principle of just cause. Intentions are good if they contribute to the
observance of the principle of a just cause (for example, when returning an enslaved people to
their original territory). Likewise, both the probability of success and the principle of
proportionality must take into account the benefits and costs of war. Upon closer examination,
it can be stated that in the considered moral theory, two fundamentally different interpretations
coexist. The principles of jus ad bellum have a normative source in pacifism, with its quest to
end violence. However, unlike pacifism, the supporters of this theory are convinced that
violence can only be stopped by violence. The second part of the jus in bello theory is the
legacy of militarism and is expressed in the fact that in this part war and violence are morally
justified from the standpoint of justice.
The most common argument against the postulates of a just war is based on the fact
that, according to opponents, this theory is not a very successful attempt to synthesize
deontological and pragmatic criteria, pacifist and militaristic ethics. 92 It is easy to see that by
combining the ideas of war and justice, we get conflicting and inconsistent conclusions. It turns
out that the theory of “just war” can simultaneously act both as a prohibition on excessive
violence and as its justification. Hence, contradictions inevitably arise in the understanding of
the main basis of this theory - the principle of justice. Since actions should be assessed from
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the standpoint of the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, in this respect three situations
are logically possible when the actions of a state are fair in two aspects (both in relation to jus
ad bellum and jus in bello), in which either one aspect of jus ad bellum or jus in bello), or none
of them. Therefore, it is logical to assume that failure to comply with one group of principles
cannot be compensated for by the implementation of other principles. The implementation of
the principles of just war implies adherence to both the rules of jus ad bellum and the postulates
of jus in bello, from which there can be no deviations. However in reality there are always
many exceptions to this rule.
On the one hand, the implementation of the principles of jus ad bellum should exclude
a situation when both opposing sides have grounds equal in their normative strength for waging
a just war, since there is always a “moral asymmetry” between the actions of the aggressor and
the resistance of the victim, between the actions of a tyrannical government committing war
crimes against the civilian population, and the activity of those who by force of arms prevent
genocide. However, in reality, as demonstrated by Carl Schmitt, the use of moral rhetoric and
the very concept of justice does not lead to a peaceful settlement of military conflicts, but
entails the dehumanization of the enemy and contributes to the intensification of the tension of
confrontation. 93 Anyone who claims absolute justice and denies it to others is taking a step
towards escalating violence.
Schmitt’s realistic argument remains relevant today. Today, when military clashes are
no longer knightly tournaments or duels, which are fought according to the rules of honor, the
postulate of the limited use of force is finally losing its significance. The main forms of modern
conflicts are no longer wars of sovereign states, but humanitarian interventions and the war on
terror.94
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In the interests of this endless war with an undefined adversary, not only all known
norms of international law can be violated, but also the principles of jus in bello. The just war
theory, according to most of its theorists, may be used to justify torture, the use of drones,
illegitimate imprisonment and targeted killings without trial and investigation. 95 By asserting
that human rights are the main meaning and justification of war, we thereby proclaim some
higher moral value, for which it is worth fighting. But since the interpretation of these rights,
as well as the ways of reacting to their violation, is assigned to well-defined actors, human
rights turn into a kind of militant moralization or religious belief.
In his classic work, Michael Walzer developed the well-known concept of the highest
danger, which allows one to discard the usual restrictions of both the principles of jus ad bellum
and the principles of jus in bello which allows a conflict to transform to Clausewitzian absolute
war. According to Walzer, the carpet bombing of German civilian targets during World War
II, which often made no sense, was justified on the grounds that Nazism posed “the greatest
danger.”96 The problem is that the criterion for determining the degree of the totality of evil
remains very vague. Instead of Nazism, one can put anything here (terrorism or religious
fundamentalism, for example). The danger lies in the fact that those people who call themselves
terrorists and also proclaim the highest religious values, act as equal forces with other
participants in conflicts. In this case, the war becomes a clash of two total value systems, and
acquires an eternal and insoluble character.
As a result, just war theory finds itself in a state of deep crisis, because from a means
of limiting violence, this concept becomes a means of justifying war in the name of human
rights and building a “democratic world.” The ideologically inspired discourse of national
exclusivity and the unidirectional military-humanitarian actions undertaken by the United
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States in the international arena are evidence of the danger of this doctrine. In addition, the
constant revision of the theory, carried out by various modern authors, becomes additional
evidence of the ambiguity and inconsistency of the declared statements. As practice has shown,
the list of principles justifying violence has been expanding all the time, while the list of
constraints has practically remained unchanged. Unfortunately, we also have to admit that
cases of constructive use of just war theory are rather rare exceptions. In practice, exactly the
opposite is observed. For example, when George W. Bush was the Republican Administration
Representative under President Richard Nixon as the US Ambassador to the United Nations,
he condemned India’s humanitarian intervention in East Pakistan, consistently championing a
US foreign policy line that was deeply rooted in a realistic worldview. But 20 years later, as
Bruno Coppiters points out, after becoming President of the United States, George W. Bush
justified military action against Iraq, by relying on the theory of a just war.97
It should be noted that the idea of a moral limitation on war does not have to be
expressed in terms of justice. For example, Immanuel Kant avoided using the concept of
“justice” in relation to war, believing that this term contains moral discrimination that can lead
to increased hostility. Enlightened states can conflict and fight among themselves, while
maintaining mutual respect and the desire for peace. Kant argued that perpetual peace is
possible because the republican structure of states and the desire for mutually beneficial
cooperation make war an extremely meaningless occupation. 98 Unfortunately, Kant’s project
turned out to be untenable. In the twenty first century, the world is plunged into numerous
conflicts. The very nature of the war has also changed. According to Martin Van Creveld,
modern wars are increasingly losing their “Trinitarian character”, that is, hostilities are no
longer conducted by independent states, which, as Carl von Clausewitz argued, are a form of
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unity of government, army and people (“the government rules, soldiers fight and die, people
pay and suffer”), but by isolated subjects from this triad, which deprives the concept of war of
its former certainty. “Non-trinitarian types of wars, known collectively as ‘low intensity
conflicts’, destroy the traditional distinction between the army and the population” according
to Martin van Creveld.99 Under these conditions, the subtle division between the army
(combatants), on the one hand, and the population, on the other, inevitably disappears, which
contradicts one of the fundamental principles of a just war.
The wars of the postmodern era are increasingly leveling out other conventions of wars
of past eras: the difference between war and peace; government military institutions and private
military corporations; violent and non-violent actions as means of waging “hybrid wars”;
civilians and combatants who, depending on the interests of the international community, can
be qualified in very different ways (“rebels”, “revolutionaries”, “terrorists”, “moderate
opposition”, “separatists”). The technologies of “hybrid wars" are gradually undermining the
thesis about the justice of a defensive war. Just as a criminal can provoke a victim to resistance,
interpreting one’s actions as a manifestation of aggression, and the state, using provocative
strategies of “indirect actions” as a set of measures of a social, political, informational, nonviolent and even criminal nature,100 can create appropriate conditions for objectionable
governments. Under those governments retaliatory steps will be considered as a legitimate
reason for an invasion, and in the absence of conventional approval, armed confrontation with
them will continue in other formats of “low-intensity conflicts” - hidden wars, guerrilla wars,
“asymmetric wars”, as well as the so-called “proxy war”. These proxy wars or/and asymmetric
wars, according to Karl Deutsch, are international conflicts between two countries that are
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trying to achieve their own goals through military operations taking place on territory and using
the resources of a third country to cover the resolution of the same country’s internal conflict.101
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Chapter 4. Obscure boundaries. Combatant vs. non-combatant in modern
conflicts
Air warfare has experienced exponential advancement, as evidenced by recent combat
operations. This is due to a number of factors, including the speed with which the interference
was carried out, the potential to strike distant targets (thanks to in-flight refueling), and the
ability to reduce the attacker's causalities (thanks to the aircraft's limited vulnerability against
a low-tech enemy and the use of UAV’s). Because of public opinion's reluctance for
participation in financially costly and deadly battles, this latter asset has become increasingly
important. Air warfare, however, does have a significant financial cost owing to, among other
things, the rapid degradation of the equipment.
Regardless of the opposite practice during the World War II, the concept of
differentiation has a well-established conventional position in modern times, and airstrikes are
no exception. 102 No State has ever contested its binding nature, and it has been included into
nearly every military guide and booklet.103
In December 1969, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously approved
Resolution 2444, which clearly acknowledges the concept of civilian immunity as well as its
supporting principle demanding involved factions to maintain a constant distinction between
non-combatants and combatants. During Mission Allied Force in the former Yugoslavia,
NATO spokesman Jamie Shea stated in a conference that customary international law demands
fighters to make a distinction between soldiers and civilians at all instances and to conduct their
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actions solely toward military objectives. 104 NATO General Secretary George Robertson then
announced that the alliance's aims were only military in nature and did not include civilian or
urban targets.105 Iraqi and Yugoslavian objections about the United States and its allies’ attacks
on civilians also show the influence of judicial system on the binding nature of the concept of
distinction, even if the two nations ultimately disregarded the norm.
Civilians near military targets are often no coincidence. In 2003, Iraqi authorities
stationed anti-aircraft weapons in civilian population centers and military troops took over
residential neighborhoods, storing weapons and equipment in clinics, classrooms, and
mosques.106 However, the fact that the opponent purposefully moves civilian population nearby
military objectives as shields, does not exempt the attacker from adhering to the principle of
distinction, even if, under customary international law, the responsibility for putting civilians
at risk might well fall on the targeted belligerent.107 Recent experience, nevertheless,
demonstrates that the presence of civilians close to military objectives, even if forced, does not
dissuade assaults against them: such operations are legal as long as the concept of
proportionality between collateral harm and acquired military advantage is observed. 108 For
example, the Taliban utilized the town of Ishaq Suleiman to conceal their artillery and tanks:
despite their location, the vehicles and equipment remained approved military objectives,
according to a Pentagon spokeswoman. 109
Allowing civilians to undertake military-related activities and employing them in
theater of operations is becoming more common. Examples include specialists and attached
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reporters, whose roles are becoming increasingly essential as a result of contemporary
warfare’s increased technological sophistication and the press’s relevance. They cannot be
labeled as human shields because they are not compelled to do so. However, in bombing
missions, it would be nearly impossible for the aircrew or commander to determine whether
such individuals were non-combatant or combatant and to discriminate between the two prior
to or during the assault. This raises the question of whether and to what degree civilians doing
military-related tasks should be included when determining whether collateral damage is
disproportionate in light of the concept of proportionality. Regarding so-called quasicombatants (e.g., those employed in arms manufacturing), they retain their civilian character
since they are not directly involved in hostilities: the war may be won merely by defeating the
opponent's combatants, regardless of the enthusiasm of its weapons producers. Thus, it is
permissible to attack a weapons factory when and where civilians work (assuming that this
does not violate the concept of proportionality), but employees cannot be bombed at home just
because they assist the enemy's war operations indirectly. 110
Transformation of war
In the essay What’s in a War? Etienne Balibar explores why the concept of a “War on
Terror” has generated much conceptual difficulty in a literature that attempts to address it in
terms of “war”.111 The confusion occurs because scholars who believe that America’s “War on
Terror” (a war fought largely through the deployment of military drones) departs from the basic
concept of war concentrate little on its substance.
Agreeing with Balibar, I contend the notion that drone warfare requires a
reinterpretation of conventional conceptions of war is valid only insofar as that “tradition” is
defined. By defining warfare in this manner, these thinkers adhere to Carl von Clausewitz’s
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“traditional” conception of war as a duel involving two opponents, each attempting to coerce
the other to own will. 112 Drone warfare requires a rethinking of traditional concepts of war,
particularly Clausewitz’s view of war as a duel.
I want to bring attention to a few issues that arise when defining war and its heritage in
this approach. The first one is that, because the traditional conception of conflict as a duel
requires the physical clash of armed forces, historic military acts of violence have likewise
followed this structure.
A second issue is how the adoption of Clausewitz’s term as a conceptual framework
has resulted in a ‘very limited conception of war as a conventional military confrontation
between nations’, as Mark Neocleous puts it.113 According to Neocleous, this so-called
conventional view of war as a duel has not only limited scholarly research and analysis of war
to a set of explanatory notes belonging to Clausewitz, but has also fostered a hypothetical
environment in which colonial violence is marginalized or even completely overlooked as an
irritating misrepresentation.114 One can see how this elimination is accomplished by the
frequent reference to Clausewitz by researchers seeking to contrast between previous wars
(which are ostensibly Clausewitzian) and present warfare (which are not). 115
Another related problem is the fundamental point that theoretical frameworks of war
may be objectively accepted as analytical instruments for classifying and categorizing state
aggression. As colonialism's background illustrates, frameworks whose goal is to normalize
one form of organized state violence as “ideal type” conflicts while identifying, categorizing,
and routinely ignoring others as “something other than war” are neither neutral nor objective.
To the contrary, exactly because these frameworks had an ideological purpose in bracketing a
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whole history of military violence – through rebranding conflicts as “little wars,”
“counterinsurgency,” “policing,” and “peacekeeping” – they require critical engagement.
Finally, due to a lack of critical understanding of the substance of previous war
traditions, many researchers who criticize drone warfare frequently do so by referring to a
romanticized picture of prior conflicts. Consider Chamayou’s several references to how, with
the introduction of drone weaponry, war degenerates into murder, slaughter, hunting — a
phrase that indicates a degradation or distortion of war from its earlier, nobler manner of
existence.116
Drones in asymmetric warfare.
The first decade of the XXI century is marked by the intensification of the processes of
forming a fundamentally new picture of the world, the vector of which is determined by the
desire of the political and economic elites of the leading powers to globalize all segments of
people's life. Representatives of the elite circles are looking for new ways to maintain their
political dominance and economic power on the planet. This is manifested most clearly during
periods of crises in individual societies of a political, economic, social, environmental,
informational and military nature, which cause an increase in dangers and threats to regional
and interregional interaction of states.
The aggravation of international competition for the possession of sales markets,
natural, technological, human, information and other resources leads to an intensification of
the struggle of the world powers for the establishment of control over the strategic regions of
the planet. The struggle takes place in complex political “battles” of states, in which the
conversation from a position of strength is still the last, and, as practice shows, the most
effective argument of politicians. This requires constant improvement of force support for the
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political course of any country, which is expressed in the development of new military
equipment, combat control technologies, new methods of demonstrating military pressure on
opponents, and the search for means of its implementation in the parameters of modern politics.
At present, the best forces and minds of mankind are involved in the invention, creation
and production of innovative types of weapons and military equipment, and the development
of methods for their use. Their appearance changes the content of political dialogues about
peace and war, the relations of the opposing sides, theoretical ideas about military force and
the prospects for its development.
It is likely that the creation of a qualitatively new weapon by any of the countries can
radically change the degree of its political pressure on alleged opponents. Moreover, the desire
to create such weapons is observed in the actions of the leaderships of many countries of the
world, especially from the point of view of discussions about the loss of the relevance of the
use of nuclear potential as the most radical way of resolving conflicts of any nature.
Economically developed countries are not only carrying out a continuous militarytechnical revolution but have also reached the line of revolution in military affairs. A new
colossal leap is taking place in the development of armaments and, as a result, in the forms and
methods of armed struggle and war as a whole. On the horizon are not only a new period of
wars of high-tech weapons, but also a period of devaluation of the role of nuclear weapons,
and a significant release of man and manpower in general from participation in armed struggle.
According to various estimates, from 30 to 50 countries around the world produce and
use unmanned aerial vehicles. The United States remains the largest player (over 30% of the
entire market for unmanned aircraft).117 The United States is also the world leader in the use of
UAVs. After the exhausting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the leitmotif of public sentiment in

117

Teteruk, and Chizhevsky, "Unmanned aerial vehicles in asymmetric conflicts." International processes 14,
no. 2 (2016): 192.

44

the United States was to abandon the fight against terrorism at the cost of American lives and
significant budgetary expenditures. Against this backdrop, drones have become a central
element of US military strategy. 118
The arguments of the supporters of the use of UAVs are that the latter allow minimizing
losses among both the military, since they are controlled from command posts located
thousands of kilometers away, 119 and among the civilian population. 120 At the same time, the
ethical problem associated with their application, also finds its resolution. UAV operators can
make more humane decisions than a soldier in the line of fire precisely because they are not
physically present in the war zone. Reduced stress levels, lack of influence of the instinct of
self-preservation, reduced exposure to strong emotions that can lead to wrong decisions
presumably allow UAV operators to act more rationally. 121
Supporters of the use of drones point out that this type of weapon has already become
an integral part of armed conflicts, just as it once happened with other types of weapons (small
arms, nuclear). It represents a new stage in the linear historical trend of increasing the distance
between the soldier and his adversary. 122 As Ronald Arkin states, the use of drones reduces the
risk of unauthorized use of weapons, since drone strikes are easily tracked and recorded, which
contributes to greater accountability. 123 Their maintenance requires fewer resources than using
traditional military equipment.124 Meanwhile, the state bears an obligation to its citizens for the
most efficient use of the collective resources entrusted to it.
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The use of drones in asymmetric warfare in response to terrorist activity is becoming
an integral element in the arsenal of developed countries. Such operations are driven by the
need to respond to modern threats and unconventional methods of warfare, but as a result, the
boundaries of the use of force are significantly blurred. Given the fact that UAVs have been
used in military operations since the 1980s, it is highly likely that targeted operations to
eliminate terrorists in the near future will remain one of the most common methods of warfare.
Eliminating terrorists without endangering the lives of military and civilians enhances
the sense of security. Therefore, at the level of basic ideas, society should approve of the use
of UAVs in armed conflicts. Consistent with this logic, in the states of the Middle East, Africa
and South Asia, which rely on the military power of the United States to fight terrorism, it
would be logical to expect that the population would welcome the use of drones. In practice,
this assumption usually turns out to be incorrect. Citizens of countries in which drones operate
show a very negative attitude towards them.
In September 2012, a team of researchers from Stanford Law School and New York
University School of Law prepared the report Living Under Drones.125 In the course of the
study, more than 130 Pakistani residents living in the northwest of the country were interviewed
in order to identify their attitude to the use of UAVs by coalition forces in these areas. From
the polls it followed that due to frequent airstrikes, the population of the territories was in a
state of severe post-traumatic stress. The constant fear of bombing led to the fear of gathering
in groups for various social events (holidays, funerals, meetings of tribal leaders). 126
The position of the European allies of the United States regarding their use of drones
also remains controversial. The EU leadership, in rare statements on the topic of UAVs, notes
that it does not consider the legal grounds on which the position of the United States is based
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to be legitimate. Moreover, there is a widespread belief in the EU that the use of lethal force
outside of active combat zones remains an exceptional measure that can only be justified by
the presence of a serious and immediate threat.127 According to Pew Research Center polls, in
2012 44% of the UK population supported the use of drones, while in Spain the same figure
was only 21% (while support among Americans was at 62%).128
The condemnation of the US policy on the use of UAVs in Muslim countries is so great
that it led to massive demonstrations that escalated into pogroms and thereby threatened the
stability of the new regimes that emerged during the Arab Spring. Unmanned aerial vehicles
provoke public discontent, which helps terrorist organizations to recruit new members. This
circumstance allowed the New York Times to state that ironically drones became the main
incentive for encouraging terrorists to take up arms, although Guantanamo Prison had
successfully coped with this in the past.129 The number of people killed as a result of suicide
attacks, whose actions were provoked by hatred in response to the use of UAV technology, is
comparable to the number of deaths as a result of airstrikes. 130
Ensuring legal regulation of the use of UAVs turns out to be extremely difficult, which
raises many questions from human rights defenders. The most acute debate remains regarding
the very right of the state to kill a person on the territory of another country without the
appropriate permission of its authorities and the conditions under which such a right can be
exercised.
At the same time, it is widely believed that the killing of alleged terrorists should be
interpreted as law enforcement activity against criminals, 131 and not as a military action or part
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of a combat operation. In the United States, the CIA, not the Department of Defense, is
responsible for most of the drone campaigns. 132 However, if drone strikes are carried out by
other agencies than the military, they fall under civil law. In this case, the use of the UAV can
be classified as political assassination, which is prohibited by international law. This argument,
in turn, is leveled by the primacy (from the point of view of the United States) of national
American legislation over international, which also gives rise to many legal conflicts when
analyzing the practice of using unmanned aerial vehicles.
To sum up, the claim that technological improvements help people make “better
decisions” is based on two false assumptions. One is that technology can distinguish between
combatants

and

non-combatants,

which

is

a

crucial

distinction

under

International Humanitarian Law. In asymmetric circumstances, such differences are
ambiguous and can only be adequately resolved via substantial legal and ethical arguments,
rather than advanced technology. Individuals who place explosives in Afghan communities are
appropriate military targets, as most would argue. However, as the International Committee of
the Red Cross observed in its meetings with legal experts, the validity of many other targets is
less obvious. The legal and moral definitions of involvement (direct or indirect) in hostilities,
as well as the statute of limitations on people’s previous engagement, are legal and moral issues
that cannot be answered by the employment of UAVs or precision weaponry alone.
A second erroneous assumption is that technological advancements can restrict such
high goals as “eliminating evil”. Even under the best of circumstances, determining
proportionality is difficult due to the difficulty of differentiating combatants from civilians and
predicting military advantage in relation to civilian harm. When aims are defined in such broad
terms, military advantage may be applied to virtually anything, and almost everything can be
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justified as a tactical strike. This is particularly true when evaluations of collateral damage and
risk to US military troops are reduced, the same two factors that previously limited military
action in the previous UAV free times.
Military personnel have employed UAVs and precise technology in a variety of ways
to improve intelligence gathering. This is undoubtedly beneficial in enforcing discriminatory
and proportionality standards. I don’t want to imply anything other. However, I do want to
emphasize that the sheer employment of certain technology in military operations does not
establish ethical or legal legitimacy on them; men, not the technologies themselves, make these
determinations. The greatest threat, according to security studies, is a misguided sense of
security. An incorrect feeling of moral validity can also lead to a harmful lack of attention when
it comes to ethical and legal issues.
There might be another method to respond to the rising and often ignorant use of such
technology, one that is not specifically addressed in this piece but is supplementary to the
argument. The idea that technologies are politically neutral and normatively indifferent is a
relatively recent development of modernity, particularly American modernity. This concept
leads to the conclusion that utilizing technology eliminates ethical concerns. On the other hand,
one may argue that technology is indeed and always has been political. 133 In summary, such a
proposition would assist us avoid becoming focused on military technology capabilities and
instead center our attention on their failure to solve moral and legal challenges.
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Chapter 5. Theoretical debates on the Use of Drones
Recent decades have witnessed a significant increase in the amount of scholarly
material produced on unmanned aircraft. The growth in the use and effect of drones across a
wide range of military activities has been accompanied by an increase in the amount of
academic studies being conducted to try to answer some of the important concerns posed by
these weapons systems. The growth is not only in terms of quality, but also in terms of
diversity: by now, drones have appeared as a topic of discussion in a wide range of academic
fields, like security studies, philosophy, politics, geography and sociology, among others.
Drone warfare raises a number of issues, including: the normative challenges that arise as a
result of the radical imbalance in the battlefield; 134 the illegal and political status of stealthy
drone operations performed by non-military organizations such as the CIA;135 the hostile
biopolitics that reinforce the lethal targeting of alleged terrorists; 136 the technological fetishism
that characterizes government narratives about drone weaponry; 137 and the racist implications
and dissenting views that undermine U.S. drone programs. 138
The issue of the emergence of the drone warfare has been approached in a variety of
ways, however there are only few attempts in the scholarly works to contextualize drone
violence in connection to earlier practices of air power violence such as “obliteration bombing”
and “supreme emergency”. This does not rule out the possibility of a completely historical
perspective on the armed drone; nevertheless, the typical method of facing such a past is with
a passing gesture rather than thorough examination. This is because the common view among
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researchers has been that drone-based violence is a relatively new phenomena, and they have
handled it as such. Labeled “drone warfare” because of its novelty, it is seen as a condition of
violence that rejects military tradition and fundamentally departs from notions that have long
been regarded as being intrinsic to the very conception of “war” itself. While this claim of
originality is a key and repeating theme in the literature, it has also not been scrutinized. I will
now discuss Grégoire Chamayou’s work A Theory of the Drone which defines the drone's
discontinuity.
According to Chamayou, a significant issue for researchers examining current patterns
of drone violence is that certain activities lie beyond the realm of conventional methods of
conceptualizing war. As a result of this break, drone warfare generates various crises of
intelligibility that cannot be handled by conventional conflict frameworks. 139 When it comes
to characterizing drone attacks, fundamental terminology and ideas such as “battlefield,”
“combat,” and “combatants” become dramatically twisted or even useless. Chamayou's
conceptual difficulty, then, comes as a result of the discontinuity between drone warfare and
prior modes of comprehending and theorizing war.
According to Chamayou, the uniqueness of drones is that they effectively eliminate the
capacity of one of the conflicting parties to physically fight the other’s aggression. This
technological capability of drones results in a fundamental change, as war ceases to be a
reciprocal relationship of violence, or at least ceases to have a minimal potential of being such.
By obliterating reciprocity, he adds, the drone has thrown the whole concept of “war” into
disarray. This transformation is so profound, according to Chamayou, it calls into question
even metaphysical conceptions relating to conflict.
However, exactly because it is presented as a preliminary assumption, this type of
statement regarding the drone’s uniqueness not only remains untested, but also underlies
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Chamayou’s whole theoretical explanation. This may be seen in the way Chamayou observes
earlier that by completely separating combat experience from the paradigm of face-to-face
fighting, war becomes something very detached. War devolves into massacre or hunting. One
no longer confronts the opponent; rather, one removes him, like one does with rabbits. 140
As previously stated, this method is far from unique to Chamayou’s work but rather
illustrates a common theoretical stance in the literature, which opposes the use of war’s
conceptual lexicon as a theoretical paradigm for examining drones’ non-reciprocal aggression.
For instance, Paul Kahn argues in his examination of what he refers to as “riskless warfare”
that labeling war as “riskless” creates an underlying paradox because “combat is not war at all”
without the application of equal risk. 141 Christian Enemark makes a similar argument,
observing that when a manner of murdering is risk-free for the individual perpetrator, it is worth
questioning whether “war” is taking place at all. 142 Enemark continues by stating that while the
characteristics of war may vary through time, the nature of war is unchanging: war, in order to
be war, must be a fight.143 As with Chamayou, both Kahn and Enemark view reciprocity as an
essential prerequisite of conflict. Due to the fact that the weaponized drone eliminates this
requirement of reciprocity entirely, academics who take this stance conclude that an armed
conflict in which one side utilizes drones is something other than warfare.
Drone warfare theories are generally developed in two stages. The first step involves
debating the appropriateness of the term “war” as a theoretical framework for understanding
modern usage of armed drones: could drone attacks be qualified as war?144 As I have shown,

140

Ibid., 91.
Paul W. Kahn, David Luban, William A. Galston, and Verna V. Gehring, The Paradox of Riskless Warfare.
Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3. (College Park, Md.: School of Public Affairs, University
of Maryland, 2002), 4.
142
Christian Enemark, “Drones, Risk, and Perpetual Force.” Ethics & International Affairs 28, no. 3 (2014):
366.
143
Ibid.
144
Ibid.
141

52

the majority of drone warfare theorists answer negatively to this question, claiming that the
non-reciprocal character of drone attack essentially contradicts conventional notions of war.
Simultaneously, these theorists believe that a negative characterization of drone warfare
is not a war but only temporary measure to conduct violence and to participate in conflicts.
According to Enemark, the conceptual gap caused by the rise of drone warfare requires a further
level of study, which unavoidably entails resolving Chamayou’s introductory question: if the
“war of drones” is no longer truly warfare, what type of “condition of violence” is it?145
This analytical need to identify the nature of drone warfare has resulted in the
acceptance of different theoretical approaches other than war with the goal of providing a more
realistic explanation of present behaviors including the deployment of armed drones. One such
scenario is what Chamayou refers to as “cynegetic war,” or warfare conducted in the manner
of hunting. If the armed drone changes the performance of war, Chamayou believes it does so
by realizing the cynegetic warfare objective of non-confrontation with killing and dominance
without actual conflict.146
This notion that violence done by armed drones is more equivalent to murder than
combat is also important to the interpretations of other opponents who refer to drones as highly
technological killers.147 Calhoun, in particular, takes a very similar approach to Chamayou,
defining drone warfare largely in terms of its discontinuity from traditional combat. Calhoun
writes in her book We Kill Because We Can that those who are adamantly opposed to the
deployment of armed drones see a divide between previous and contemporary military
tactics.148 Additionally, she adds that while war has always entailed the deliberate planned
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death of groups of people, drone warfare is novel in that it includes the deliberate, premeditated
assassination of single individuals. 149
The latter observation indicates that Calhoun's method has significant parallels with
Chamayou's. To begin, drone weaponry creates a set of inconsistencies (moral, legal, political,
tactical, and historic) with “traditional” combat for both of them. These inconsistencies, in turn,
make conceiving of drone strikes as military operations problematic, if not impossible.
Moreover, both Chamayou and Calhoun argue that manhunting and assassinations are
preferable models for comprehending the monopoly of violence indicated by drone warfare.
This monopolization of violence has also resulted in the establishment and
popularization of a third, related paradigm — specifically, the conceptualization of drone
strikes as law enforcement rather than military operations. A famous example of this technique
is Kahn’s study of “riskless warfare”. By conceptualizing “policing” as a regime of violence
theoretically and materially separated from term “war”, Kahn suggests that one way to resolve
the paradox of “riskless warfare” is to conceptualize asymmetrical conﬂict as a transformation
from warfare to policing.150 Unlike Chamayou and Calhoun, Khan, does not believe that onesided armed confrontations are inherently bad. 151 According to Kahn, the issue is rather one of
confusing conventional battlefield morality with the right morality for current, international
policing. If the military is involved in policing, it must reconsider its terms and conditions. 152
Khan praises the move from combat to policing because he believes that one result of an
unequal power to deploy force might be a self-imposed commitment to rigorously stick to legal
objectives limitations. 153 According to this logic, the deployment of armed drones heralds a
morally advantageous development: By taking the asymmetry of military conflicts to its actual
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extremes, drone warfare enhances the prospect of war being tempered by the (more limited)
system of ethics of policing.
The scholars have addressed the unpredictability of drone violence in a variety of ways,
including policing, assassination, and manhunting. It is worth noting that, while each of these
paradigms has its own conceptual uniqueness, they also are closely intertwined. For example,
manhunting and assassinations are both linked forms of violence, as assassination requires a
type of search aimed at locating and murdering the targeted individual. Similarly, manhunting
is a critical component of policing. As Tyler Wall observes in his criticism of the repurposing
of unmanned aircraft for domestic enforcement, police drones underscore unmanning police
search, that basic activity that gives the police authority. 154
The popular objections to drone warfare always center on the widely held perception
of drones as a military weapon capable of deadly targeting of specific individuals. This is
unsurprising, given that these weapons have become the primary tool used by the US in its
“War on Terror”. Thus, the US UAV program is organized discursively around the concept of
“targeted killings”: Its declared mission is to track down, apprehend, and assassinate people
suspected of being terrorists. It is exactly this background of deadly targeting that gave support
to critiques such as those by Chamayou and Calhoun. By situating their criticisms inside
contexts such as manhunting and assassinations, Chamayou and Calhoun are able to uncover
and criticize the deadly counterterrorism rationale that underpins contemporary usage of armed
drones. However, in doing so, they – and other critics who take a similar approach –
unintentionally contribute deemphasis of the violent phenomena they want to critique.
Drone bombing’s deadly consequences extend long beyond the period of the planned
assassination. Not only death, but also life under drones is intolerably violent: in addition to
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murder, drone strikes mutilate and dismember the bodies of bystanders, who must continue
living with those injuries; they damage property, displacing people; the strong presence of
drones disrupts daily life, contributing to the social degeneration of targeted areas; and promote
a continuous fear of drone attacks. These are only some of the deadly consequences of drones
that manhunting and assassination frameworks cannot adequately account for. I say
“adequately”, since it should not be assumed that skeptics who subscribe to these frameworks
ignore these larger violent consequences. However, they do so indirectly, as they perceive
violence as being beyond the intended aim and purpose of UAV weaponry. Chamayou's
analysis illustrates this indirect method in disputing the argument that drone bombardment is
less brutal than previous aerial bombardment campaigns due to its accuracy. 155
Chamayou’s conclusion is both appealing and problematic. 156 It is appealing because it
successfully criticizes the counter-terrorist reasoning of deploying drones to assassinate targets:
When contrasted to other tactical options, drone attacks are the most lethal. At the same
moment, it is problematic since Chamayou characterizes the drone as a “assassin-drone,” a
weapon whose brutality is defined entirely in terms of its ability to murder specific targets.
While important, Chamayou’s perspective creates two simultaneous issues. To begin, if we
characterize the drones only from a perspective of the counterterrorist tactic for which it is
being deployed, we epistemically minimize the brutality of drone attacks by making “targeted
murders” the sole lens through which such violence can be understood. Second, the weapon’s
shape is significant, as it reveals the essential similarities that connect current drone usage to
colonial air force tactics. When drone strikes are contextualized within the older violent legacy
of aerial bombing, it is demonstrated that their larger non-fatal consequences are as much an
element of how the weaponized drone operates as its deadly violence. Chamayou’s fear is that
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a reference to earlier types of aerial bombardment may lead to the perception of drone strikes
as advancement. The type of logic that underpins such an assessment is dependent on a
subsequent reduction in related activity. In this example, the reduction resembles the form of
characterizing drone attacks as isolated acts of violence. However, the perception of drone
attacks from the ground is not one of quick violent actions interwoven with intervals of nonviolence. The devastation and suffering left in the aftermath of a drone strike, as well as the
terror associated with living in a world defined by constant drone attacks, point instead to a
protracted and structured practice of violence, the horrors of which extend further than the
instant violent impacts of a single strike.
To summarize: because of their philosophical attachment to discontinuity, drone
opponents frequently overlook the tactical and technological lineage of these weapons of mass
destruction. While manhunting and targeted killing are beneficial images for debating the
strategic rationale for the US implementation of drones in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan (as well
as Israel’s mobilization of UAVs in Palestine),157 they continue to frame drone violence almost
solely in terms of targeted killings strategy. By adhering to the policy’s discursive constraints,
manhunting and targeted killing do not substantially undermine the mainstream narrative where
the drone is portrayed as a weapon meant to kill specific individuals. Indeed, by adopting these
frameworks, critics have unintentionally reinforced that narrative, by assigning an important
authenticity to the drone and its violence – for example, “assassin-drone” or “hunter-drone” –
that equates to the concept that these arms are first and primarily accurate weapons of war.
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Conclusion
The risk of allowing judgments of a technology’s conceptual capabilities to correlate
with how this would, or, more importantly, should, be used is demonstrated by the air power
scenario. Not only are these technical evaluations likely to be wrong in significant ways, as
they were for proponents of the “war economy”, but the combination of capabilities and
practical use gives them an undeserved moral weight. Researchers start to contextualize
controversial ethical questions about human intention and responsibility, as evidenced most
egregiously by the manner air power adversaries and morale bombing believers transformed
knowledge that air power could target civilians. Unfortunately, we can see this trend among
even some of the most articulate and passionate participants in the drone warfare ethical
discussion. Upcoming drone capabilities are even more loaded with the risk of allowing
expected technology capabilities to drive the ethical debate.
New challenges over suitable methods may be the ones most prominently highlighted
by an emerging military technology but focusing too much on them will just feed into the
recurrent tendency in conflict to reinterpret originally restricted aims to match existing military
forces and technology. In the case of air power, a concentration on the technically achievable
approach of bombing cities flowed into vague and exaggerated notions of what war can and
should achieve, such as the destruction of opponent’s will to fight. With such unachievable
goals as a guide, it became increasingly possible that, in addition to the unavoidable
uncertainties, war agents would be persuaded to turn promising new methods into objectives
in and of themselves. Indeed, opponents are concerned that the amount of impunity granted to
combatants by drones may make it too simple to go to war, leading to lazy thinking about who
needs to be targeted and how their deaths will help achieve the righteous goals intended.
The rationale for air power suggests that we shouldn’t ignore the jus ad bellum issues
that drones may cause. Given the temptations they frequently bring, and the way they might
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destabilize our capacity to think clearly about the aims of war, the topic of why we fight
becomes even more relevant. In what precise method should a weapon be used to achieve just
goals? Is the new weapon’s capabilities changing how we think about goals in the first place?
These considerations, rather than leading us down an epistemological rabbit hole, must drive
our war ethics, especially in the face of potentially revolutionary developing military
technologies.
What happens when war breaks out? Efforts must be taken to combat what, in the case
of air power, was a propensity to overestimate military need, putting people and civilian
infrastructure in risk. Just war theorists may need to constantly concentrate on tightening the
borders between combatant and non-combatant, and potentially even enlarging the latter’s
sphere, at least in talks about drone warfare emergence. Even when just war theory is applied,
the very military technologies that are ostensibly meant to adhere more and more to its
principles cannot be allowed to blunt the critical edge we require when considering the ethics
of warfare. The instance of air power is a stark warning of what might happen if they don't.
The points I make here in this work are not really meant to argue that drones shouldn’t
be used to fight wars; rather, they are meant to emphasize the need to adapt our violence ethics
to account for the technological benefits (and downsides) of drones. Terrorism and the
omnipresence of wars engaging with non-state actors have altered the environment in which
we analyze the classic norms of the just war tradition, and the rising use of drones should do
the same. As drone technology becomes more integrated into military tactics, assuming that
they are just like any other weapon and thus do not pose a threat to how just war fundamentals
are understood is to understate their actual implementation and postpone what must be an
unavoidable renegotiation of just war fundamentals.
The ethical issues addressed in this thesis are not the culmination of the subject; rather,
they serve as a starting point for further research. On one hand, with breakthroughs in drone
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technology leading the way, automation might be the next military revolution. Imagining a
series of scenarios in the not-too-distant future, we may see how our understanding and
implementation of just war principles can change. Experts expect the ultimate creation of a
fleet of UAVs capable of staying overhead for up to five years and enabling fast armed
responses throughout the world, which would constitute an increasing web of surveillance sites.
This would ostensibly make it easier to combat terrorism and maintain the responsibility to
protect possible standards, while also decreasing the value of state sovereignty. Will all
countries, however, consent to such a drone distribution? Is such a network usable by any state
or group of states? What criteria should be implemented? Such modern drones would,
presumably, cut collateral harm significantly. Would they make conventional military
techniques, such as the deployment of bombs and missiles, obsolete?
On the other hand, limited violence in contemporary asymmetric conflicts still hasn’t
reached its breaking point. War on terror could be an obvious example of how boundaries have
been blurred between combatant and non-combatant forces. Even though that precise bombing
or targeted killing decreased the number of involved objects collateral damage caused by armed
drones is still inflicting varieties of causalities among civilian populations starting from PostTraumatic Stress Disorder and ending with different types of mutilations of the human body,
let alone death.
The erasing of history, the horrific consequences, and the casualties of drone
bombardment all operate in tandem. Its theorists are able to limit the historical viewpoint taken
on military drones to one that deals only with the history of manhunting and not with a history
of air power by excluding any examination of the specific means employed in modern
manhunting. Similarly, reducing the history of UAVs to a narrative about manhunting
encourages a dissociation from what is unique about the weaponized drone and its brutality —
drones are typically mixed with other manhunting tools and presumed to be similar to them. A
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history of manhunting describes the weapon employed in modern manhunts as the “hunterdrone” and the “assassin-drone,” frequently disguising its historical nature as the “bomberdrone” and the “terror-drone,” as explored by military thinkers and critics. Finally, these
erasures seek to preclude members of the targeted communities from becoming drone victims.
People who live beneath drones, who are traumatized psychologically and physically, whose
houses are damaged, and whose lives are ruined, are rarely mentioned in manhunting narratives
- until they are murdered. Their statements are critical in understanding what drone strikes are,
what they do, and who they are used against, but they are ignored. Hence this work raises a set
of forthcoming questions: how should we evaluate combatants and non-combatants in modern
asymmetric warfare, how do we evaluate the rules of contemporary “acceptable” warfare, and
what moral and ethical issues do drones generate in potential conflicts?
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